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LESSONS FROM CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF A STRONG
JUDICIARY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR SUCCESSFUL
HUMANITARIAN AID
Scot W. Greenwood
Armed conflict between sovereign states creates many problematic issues that
civilized societies must address. Reconstruction of war torn nations is restricted by
human rights violations, both during and following armed conflict, and the
difficulty of providing humanitarian aid to refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs).' These problems often go hand in hand, as most refugees and
IDPs are the victims of human rights violations suffered at the hands of conflicting
parties. In recent years, many conflict areas have received humanitarian aid and
benefited from the involvement of foreign governments to the extent that "nation-
building" has become a common term associated with humanitarian aid in post-
conflict situations. However, due to the complexity of many of the problems faced
by refugees and IDPs, the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and nation-building
efforts as a whole is variable.
One of the most important elements to ensure that humanitarian aid is
successful is the need to maintain protection for refugees and IDPs while
assistance is being provided. Protection for refugees and IDPs must be provided
concurrently with humanitarian efforts to facilitate proper reintegration with
society.4 More importantly, ensuring that a legal system is in place to adequately
address human rights violations is an essential component to providing protection
and ensuring that humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts have sustainable,
long-term positive effects.5  The necessary protection that must accompany
"J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 2003; B.S. Purdue University, 1996. Scot W. Greenwood
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1. See DAVID A. KORN, EXODUS WITHIN BORDERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRISIS OF
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 3 (1999).
2. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO), NATO's ROLE IN RELATION TO THE
CONFLICT IN KOsovo (July 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited
July 17, 2003).
3. See KORN,supra note 1, at 100-101.
4. See id. at 100.
5. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (LCHR), Kosovo: PROTECTION AND PEACE-
BUILDING. PROTECTION OF REFUGEES. RETURNEES. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS. AND
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returning refugees and IDPs cannot be adequately maintained if ongoing human
rights violations go unpunished and unresolved.6 Refugees and IDPs will not feel
safe and secure within the society in which they are attempting to be reintegrated
without an effective legal system that addresses human rights claims. 7 The efforts
of humanitarian aid organizations will founder without the presence of an effective
judiciary.8 The sense of protection provided by a just and functioning legal system
will enable humanitarian aid efforts to reach their maximum potential. 9
The necessity of protecting human rights with a functioning judiciary in order
to support successful humanitarian aid effects can be evidenced by an examination
of three recent post-conflict situations, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH),
Kosovo, and East Timor. This article will briefly describe the conflicts that
occurred in these areas, the human rights violations associated with these areas,
and the major problems with the judicial systems of these areas following the
cessation of hostilities that allowed on-going human rights violations to occur.
The applicable human rights law and judicial mechanisms employed regarding
MINORITIES 4 (1999), available at http://www.lchr.org/archives/arc-refs/feature/kosovo/peacebuilding
.htm (last visited July, 17, 2003). Physical safety and other protection concerns can only be addressed
in the presence of a functioning civil authority and security presence. Id. In the case of Kosovo, the
initial absence of these institutions resulted in serious threats to the human rights protection situation of
refugees, returnees, IDPs, and minorities, as well as effecting long-term prospects for reconciliation and
future peaceful co-existence. Id. The delayed arrival of a functioning civil administration under the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) allowed for escalation of violence and crime to occur
with virtual impunity, thus making the security situation more precarious. Id.
6. "The failure to address past and ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law promptly and effectively, and to create a sense of law and order, can impede the broader
objectives of a humanitarian operation." Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a
Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47
(2001). "A functioning judicial system can positively affect reconciliation and confidence-building
efforts within often highly traumatized post-crisis societies, not least because it can bring justice to
those responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law." Id. at 60.
7. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 46-47. "The lack of adequate law enforcement and the failure
to remove criminal offenders can inevitably affect both the authority of the mission and the local
population's willingness to respect the rule of law." Id. at 60. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (LCHR), KOsovO: A FRAGILE PEACE (2000), available at
http://www.lchr.org/archives/arcrefs/feature/kosovo/kosovofeature.htm (last visited July 17, 2003)
[Hereinafter LCHR: KOSOVO]. "The lack of effective judicial and policing mechanisms is a key factor
in perpetuating a climate of insecurity in Kosovo." Id.
8. The humanitarian experience gained from Kosovo has proven that, although the initial strategy
of the operations of giving priority to traditional peace-building efforts (including ensuring peace and
security and facilitating refugee return), the administration of justice must be considered a top priority
from the outset. Hansjorg Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 47. "When post-conflict reconstruction fails,
international donors are discouraged, confidence is undermined within the society, and the very
professional and business people needed for reconstruction may leave." KORN, supra note 1, at 119.
9. For humanitarian aid efforts to be successful on a society wide basis (i.e. "nation-building"),
they must be able to "function within a framework of law and order," and there must be a judiciary that
can perform "minimal judicial and prosecutorial functions" established at the earliest stages. See
Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 47-48. Successful humanitarian aid operations have been shown to
"generate confidence between opposing parties or lessen tension between them, for instance by
alleviating human sufferings on both sides." Tatsuro Kunugi, The Strategy of Humanitarian Assistance,
24 U.N. CHRON. 54 (1987).
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protection of human rights in these areas will also be examined, with particular
emphasis placed on the need for a strong judicial system in aiding these
mechanisms to function. Also presented is (i) evidence that the protection of
human rights is an important component in allowing humanitarian aid and nation
building efforts to be successful and (ii) evidence demonstrating that the
international community must play a vital role in strengthening the judicial
systems of these post-conflict areas.
Lastly, this paper will examine the importance of insuring a strong,
functioning judicial system to protect the human rights of refugees and IDPs in the
context of two more recent conflicts, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. This article
will demonstrate the vital role played by the international community in rebuilding
post-conflict judiciaries; specifically, for any post-conflict judicial system to
adequately protect human rights and allow for successful humanitarian aid efforts,
discussion will highlight the necessity of international community involvement in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Following the succession of the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia from the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991,10 the wars that followed
this succession and the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations
by the international community, BiH declared its own independence from the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 5, 1992." Following this
declaration of independence, various ethnic groups vied for territorial control
within BiH, most notably Bosnian Serbs, who desired to remain with Serbia to
form a "greater Serbian" nation, and Croats, who desired Herzegovina to become
part of newly independent Croatia.12 This conflict was finally resolved with the
10. Slovenia and Croatia succeeded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on June 25,
1991 following the results of an earlier national referendum. Bola Ajibola, Human Rights in the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 189 (1997).
1I. See MISHA GLENNY, THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-
1999 638 (1999). In January of 1992, Bosnia - Herzegovina (BiH) and Macedonia informed the
European Community that they sought recognition as independent states, however BiH was denied at
this time. Ajibola, supra note 10, at 189. "Bosnia-Herzegovina was the third largest republic in former
Yugoslavia with an estimated population of 4.35 million. It had the most diverse population of the
republics with no one nationality comprising a majority. Ethnic Muslims: a South Slavic, Serb-Croat
speaking people of Islamic faith, have a plurality comprising 43.7 percent; next are the ethnic Serbs
with 31.3 percent, and Croats with 17.3 percent. Approximately 5.5 percent of the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina consider themselves ethnic Yugoslavs. The ethnic distribution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina before 1993 was quite diverse and different nationalities were not concentrated in any
particular area." Id. at 190.
12. See GLENNY, supra note II, at 638. "Six months after the outbreak of the war, the Yugoslav
crisis had assumed serious international dimensions. The United States, Germany, Britain and France,
Greece, Turkey, Russia, Iran and a number of Middle Eastern countries all pursued widely different
policies with regard to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The difficulty in reconciling these became
2003
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signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (GFAP) in Paris on December 14, 1995.13 However, by the time the
fighting had halted, it displaced an estimated 640,000 to 800,000 refugees and
IDPs.
14
The GFAP not only ended four years of conflict within BiH, but also ended a
conflict "marked by brutal human rights violations on a scale not witnessed in
Europe since the end of World War Il."'5  Human rights violations involving
violence, such as rape and murder were common during the conflict, however,
violent human rights abuses continued throughout BiH following the formal end of
the conflict. Many of these abuses were experienced by refugees and IDPs
returning to their homes following the signing of the GFAP, which guaranteed all
displaced persons the right to return to their pre-war home of origin.' 6 Refugees
and IDPs were subjected to ethnic discrimination, political intimidation, and
discrimination in terms of employment, education, and violent abuses throughout
BiH. 17 More specifically, minority returnees and IDPs that returned to their former
places of displacement were subjected to human rights abuses and thus could not
adequately be re-integrated into a functioning civil society.
For example, in the northwestern Bosnian city of Velika Kladusa, a city that
experienced one of the highest refugee return rates in BiH following the end of the
conflict, returnees and IDPs that had been associated with the Demokratska
Narodna Zajednica (DNZ) political party were subjected to ongoing human rights
abuses.' 8 Supporters of the DNZ had actively fought against the Fifth Corps of the
insuperable when violence broke out in Bosnia, three months after the peacekeepers arrived in Croatia
in January 1992. With encouragement from the Americans, lzetbegovid opted for independence on 5
April, an injudicious move for a government with limited military resources and two potential enemies.
The Bosnian Serbs rejected the declaration and the fighting began." Id.
13. Brett Dakin, The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. The Republika Srpska:
Human Rights in a Mulit-Ethnic Bosnia, 15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 247 (2002). See Christine
Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton
Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 103 (2001). "The reconstruction envisaged by the GFA required
attention to the 'most difficult problems of a modem society'.... The GFA attempts to address these
problems through three strategies: provision for democratic elections; international controls to ensure
compliance with its vision; and human rights guarantees." Id. at 106. The negotiations for the GFAP
were conducted in November, 1995 at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, and as a
result, the GFAP is commonly referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dakin, supra, at 247.
14. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
ENVOY - EXTERNAL RELATIONS UNIT, BH REFUGEES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
June 1996.
15. Dakin, supra note 13, at 247.
16. This is evidenced by the Constitution of the Federation of BiH which states, "All refugees and
displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes of origin." Ajibola, supra note 10, at
193.
17. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, Human Rights Officer and Head of Velika Kladusa
Field Office, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7,
2001); Interview with Kanson Dean, Velika Kladusa Station Commander, International Police Task
Force, in Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7, 2001); Interview with Husein Delid, Mayor, Velika Kladusa, in
Velika Kladusa, BiH (June 7, 2001).
18. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17; Interview with Kanson Dean, supra
note 17; Interview with Husein Deli, supra note 17. The Demokratska Narodna Zajednica (DNZ) was
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Bosnian Army during the war. Following the return of DNZ affiliated individuals,
tensions remained high between supporters of the Bosnian army and supporters of
the DNZ.' 9 In the Summer of 2001, over five years after the signing of the GFAP,
human rights violations continued to occur involving the local citizenry, largely
associated with the DNZ (90%), and the local police force, which is affiliated with
the Party of Democratic Action-the primary political wing of the opposition to
Fikret Abdid's former army.2° Human rights abuses by Velika Kladusa police
became so widespread that the local citizens trusted only the international
community and felt that only the local International Police Task Force (IPTF)
presence kept the local police from initiating acts of revenge.2'
In Velika Kladusa, DNZ affiliated returnees and IDPs also experienced
human rights violations in other areas. Teachers affiliated with DNZ in the Velika
Kladusa region were denied available jobs, even though the applicants were
completely qualified (some having received teaching awards).22 Job postings were
still advertised following the rejection of qualified DNZ-affiliated applicants.23
Children of DNZ affiliated returnees were also removed from the local school and
were not allowed to attend class based upon their parent's political affiliation.
24
These abuses are violations of the applicable human rights laws in place in Bil
and could be countered by the presence of a strong judiciary enforcing these
human rights laws. Although a mechanism had been created under the GFAP to
investigate and address human rights violations, one of the primary causes of these
on-going abuses was that the judicial system in BiH was too weak to enforce the
applicable law.25 The international community needed to address this issue and
take steps to strengthen the judiciary. Before discussing this GFAP judicial
mechanism, the steps taken to strengthen its effectiveness, .and the impact of
strengthening the judiciary on refugee return and humanitarian aid efforts, the
applicable human rights law in BiH requires examination.
a political party created in part by Fikret Abdid. Sarajevo Government; Muslim Rebel Fikret Abdic
Returns to Politics with a New Party, British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 3, 1996, EE/D255 I/A. Fikret Abdit was a former Bosnian businessman who started Agrokomerc,
an agricultural firm that was one of the largest food processing companies in the former Yugoslavia.
Id; Fikret Abdic Reaffirms Faith in Zagreb and Belgrade Peace Declarations, British Broadcasting
Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 3, 1993, EE/1836/C. During the conflict, Bosnians
loyal to Fikret Abdid in and around the city of Bihad took up arms and fought against the Fifth Corps of
the Bosnian army. Bihac; Belgrade TV Says Rebel Muslims Refugees are Returning to Velika Kladusa,
British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1995, EE/2286/C; Samantha
Power, U.N. Fears for Civilians in Bihac, UPI, Aug. 1I, 1994, LEXts, Nexis Library, UPI File. As a
result, many Bosnians returning to the area fae hostility either because they fought with Abdid's army
or they are affiliated with DNZ. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17; Interview with
Kanson Dean, supra note 17.
19. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Interview with Kanson Dean, supra note 17.
22. Interview with Oliver Schmidt-Gutzat, supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id; Interview with Husein Delid, supra note 17.
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Applicable Human Rights Law in BiH
The Constitution of BiH, contained within Annex 4 of the GFAP,
incorporates international human rights instruments directly into enforceable
domestic law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
26
The GFAP provides that the governing bodies established under the treaty, "shall
secure to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms."2 7  Such rights "will be
secured by adhering to a number of treaties including the European Convention
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).,, 28  "An
extensive annex of conventions is also incorporated as law .... " which includes
the ICCPR, the 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto and the 1966 Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 29 According to Ajibola:
The instruments themselves were carefully selected with a view to ensuring that
only those of United Nations or world-wide significance were incorporated. An
additional feature is that with the exception of the Universal Declaration (which is
of fundamental importance), all others are prescriptive and are intended to impose
legal obligations. By incorporating them directly into the Constitution, they are
enforceable domestically and require no separate incorporating legislation.
30
In fact, "the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), including its Protocols, is directly applicable law
and has priority over all other law at both the national and entity level."'" The
Constitution of BiH also requires that the country become or remain "a party to
listed U.N. and regional human rights instruments, including treaties that are not
yet in force and treaties that have attracted significant reservations from other state
parties., 32 Thus, laws guaranteeing internationally recognized standards of human
rights are now in place in BiH and directly applicable as domestic law. 33  The
26. See Chinkin & Paradine, supra note 13, at 107; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) collectively constitute the
"International Bill of Rights." Carla Bongiomo, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human
Rights Law to the United Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623,635 (2002).
27. Henry Perrit, Jr. & Christopher Lhulier, Focus on Cyberlaw: Information Access Based on
International Human Rights Laws, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899,911 (1997).
28. Id.
29. Timothy W. Waters, The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords, Property Disputes, and Bosnia's
Real Constitution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517, 530 n. 40 (1999).
30. Ajibola, supra note 10, at 192.
3 1. Waters, supra note 29, at 530. The governmental structure created under the GFAP includes a
national level federal govemment and two subordinate government "entities," the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Id.
32. Chinkin & Paradine, supra note 13, at 107.
33. "Each of these instruments is immediately enforceable at the domestic level, making Bosnia's
system of human rights protection stronger, at least on paper, than that of most countries." Dakin,
supra note 13, at 248. The UDHR was deemed to be applicable during the conflict preceding the
signing of the GFAP. See Geoffrey S. DeWeese, The Failure of the International Court of Justice to
Effectively Enforce the Genocide Convention, 26 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 625, 635 (1998). Bosnia
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international community had taken the initial step in strengthening the judicial
system in BiH by determining the human rights law to be applied following the
conflict.
The next section will examine the judicial mechanism created under the
GFAP to address violations of human rights in BiH. This section will be followed
by a discussion of the effectiveness of this judicial mechanism, the necessity of the
presence of the international community in allowing this mechanism to function,
and the impact of increased judicial enforcement of human rights violations on the
success of humanitarian aid efforts.
The Commission on Human Rights
The Agreement on Human Rights, contained in Annex 6 of the GFAP,
established the Commission on Human Rights, which is composed of the Human
Rights Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber.34 According to Dakin:
The Ombudsman, appointed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), is responsible for investigating alleged or apparent violations of
human rights guaranteed by the constituent agreements of the Dayton Peace
Agreement. Following any investigation, the Ombudsman may issue a report
setting out his or her findings and legal conclusions, facilitate a friendly
settlement, or refer the case to the Human Rights Chamber.
35
The Human Rights Chamber issues decisions that are binding within all of the
governmental entities in BiH.36 The Human Rights Chamber allows individuals,
associations, non-governmental organizations, and governments to bring a private
right of action against all three of the governmental bodies in BiH.37 Before an
application to the Human Rights Chamber is accepted, "the Chamber must
consider if effective remedies are available to the applicant through relevant
petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on March 20, 1993, claiming that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had violated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907,
the UDHR, the UN Charter, and other principals of customary international law. Id. at 634. In ruling
on these claims, the ICJ "determined that both Bosnia and Yugoslavia had succeeded to the
commitments of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Id. at 635. Thus, by succession,
the UDHR had been applicable in Bosnia before the GFAP was signed and the Bosnian Constitution
drafted.
34. Dakin, supra note 13, at 249. "The Ombudsman system, which is of Scandinavian origin, has
been employed and it has had a varying degree of success in many countries outside its native
environment. Its success largely depends on how persistent (one might say stubborn) the Ombudsman
is in unearthing abuses and pursuing remedies of redress." Ajibola, supra note 10, at 194.
35. Dakin, supra note 13, at 249.
36. Id. The judges of the Human Rights Chamber represent the people of BiH in the following
manner: "six judges are Bosnian (two Muslims and two Croats appointed by the Federation, and two
Serbs appointed by the Republika Srpska), while the remaining eight judges, appointed by the Council
of Europe, are citizens of countries other than Bosnia or any neighboring state." Id. The president of




DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
domestic courts or administrative agencies. ' 3  Once the Chamber accepts an
application, it requests written observations from the two parties involved.39
Following the receipt of the written observations, the Chamber deliberates and
chooses a course of action, which can include the facilitation of friendly
settlement, the adoption and delivery of a legally binding decision, or the ordering
of the respondent party to take provisional measures. 40  The Chamber handles
cases involving the right of individuals to return to their pre-war homes and "has
also issued decisions in cases concerning torture and detention, the death penalty
(which it declared illegal), employment discrimination, pension rights, and
environmental degradation.'
Thus, the Human Rights Agreement created a system in Bosnia to specifically
address human rights violations. However, violations continued to persist
following the establishment of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human
Rights Chamber, primarily as a result of lack of enforcement and overall judicial
weakness. This mechanism could not function properly without the international
community providing for enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber decisions
and strengthening of the overall judicial system.
The Enforcement Problem, the Ferhadya Mosque Decision, and the
Strengthening of the Judiciary by the International Community
The Human Rights Chamber has no enforcement body to carry out its
decisions and it must therefore rely on the good faith of the respondent party for
enforcement.42 Therefore, the Human Rights Chamber must rely on other
international bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Stabilization Force, the IPTF, the OSCE, and the United Nations (UN) Office of
the High Representative to provide enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber
decisions. 43 This lack of enforcement has caused decisions of the Human Rights
Chamber to go unimplemented, however, following an overall strengthening of the
judicial system throughout BiH, "implementation rates have steadily increased
since the Chamber's first decision was issued in 1996, but the Chamber still
struggles to achieve full compliance. 44  It appears from the necessity of
international enforcement of the Human Rights Chamber's decision regarding the
Ferhadija Mosque, that without a strengthening of the judicial system by the
international community, the Chamber would not be able to adequately address
human rights violations in BiH. 45
38. Id. at 251.
39. Id.
40. Id. "A provisional measure allows the Chamber to stop the respondent party's activity of
which the applicant complains while the Chamber further deliberates on the merits of the case." Id. at
255.
41. Id. at 252. "As of December 2001, 8481 applications had been registered with the Chamber."
Id. As of that time, the Chamber had issued 1033 decisions. Id.
42. Id. at 259.
43. Id. at 259-260.
44. See Dakin, supra note 13, at 260.
45. See id. at 267-268.
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The Ferhadija Mosque, destroyed during the conflict, was one of the largest
and most famous mosques in Bosnia. Permits for its reconstruction had been
repeatedly denied following a Human Rights Chamber decision holding that
disallowing reconstruction was a violation of the right of Muslims to freely
manifest their religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the ECHR.46 Following this
decision, the respondent party, the Republika Srpska, initially failed to grant the
reconstruction permit.47 Thus, the respondent party did not adequately address an
on-going violation of human rights. Therefore, the goal of humanitarian aid
agencies in restoring a civil society was being undermined by the refusal to protect
the fundamental human right of returnees to "freely manifest their religion." The
judgment of the Human Rights Chamber was eventually implemented following
"persuasive action against the Republika Srpska by the international
community.
48
The authorities of the Republika Srpska eventually issued the permit to
reconstruct the Ferhadija Mosque;49 however, judicial enforcement had to be
strengthened by the international community before the decision would be
honored. This case demonstrates that in order for humanitarian aid efforts to be a
success, there lies a need for a strong judiciary with the purpose of enforcing
human rights laws. If the judiciary was unable to enforce the decision of Human
Rights Chamber regarding the Ferhadija Mosque, violations of the right to freely
manifest one's religion would continue and the goal of restoring a civil society
where human rights are protected would be unobtainable. In this case, the
international community had to provide the enforcement to strengthen the judiciary
and render the decision of the Human Rights Chamber effective. Lacking the
presence of a strong judiciary to enforce the decisions of the Human Rights
Chamber, this mechanism would be inadequate in protecting the human rights of
individuals in BiH, especially refugees returning to areas where they are a
minority. A strong judiciary must be present in BiH, especially considering that
there exists an agreement, which merges the Human Rights Chamber with the BiH
court system. 50
As for wide scale human rights abuses, such as those described in Velika
Kladusa, the High Representative 51 has recognized the need for a strong judiciary
46. Id. at 259.
47. Id. at 267.
48. See id. at 268. "Some members of the Islamic Community argued that the only way to begin
reconstruction would be for the High Representative to simply impose the Chamber's decision on the
local authorities." Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 268. The permit for the Mosque's reconstruction was granted on March 24, 2001. See
Human Rights Co-ordination Center, HRCC Human Rights Report: 01 September 2000 - 31 March
2001 1 (2001).
50. See Dakin, supra note 13, at 265. Under an agreement signed on November 10, 2000, the
Human Rights Chamber is to operate in the same manner as it has since 1995 until December 31, 2003.
See Human Rights Co-ordination Center, supra note 49, at 49.
51. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is the working arm of the United Nations High
Representative. With the complete backing of the international community, the High Representative
represents the highest rule of law currently existing in BiR. The High Representative has the authority
to enact laws that are binding on the government entities and citizens of BiH. See http://www.ohr.intl.
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in protecting the human rights of returnees and IDPs. In December 2000, "the
High Representative established the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) to
provide a consolidated, comprehensive, and assertive approach to the identification
and implementation of reforms to the justice sector. ' , 52 The IJC "has become the
lead international agency for judicial reform and promotion of the rule of law
throughout BiH, and will co-ordinate, consolidate and accelerate reform
activities. 53  Furthermore, training in human rights law was employed to help
guard minority returnees from human rights abuses:
A comprehensive three-year training program on the ECHR and European legal
standards was initiated in June 2000 by the Council of Europe with one year of
funding provided by the United States of America. Between September 2000 and
June 2001 over 250 judges and prosecutors will have attended a one week training
course, out of which a selected few will therefore receive specialized training on
how to conduct training courses themselves. Despite the fact that the ECHR has
been part of domestic law since, at least, December 1995, most judges were
ignorant of both the substance of the Convention and its status in the country.
Strengthening the functioning and independence of the judiciary through
developing local capacity is an important element of this programme.
54
Mandated by the international community, these improvements to the
judiciary will help address widespread human rights abuses in BiH.
The positive effect of the international community's bolstering of the
enforcement of Human Rights Chamber decisions and overall strengthening of the
judiciary on refugee and IDP return can be demonstrated by the increase in the
number of property claims that were resolved by the government.
"In February and March 2001, the Human Rights Chamber ruled that the non-
enforcement of the decisions of the (CRPC) [Commission for Real Property
Claims] constitutes a violation under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and awarded the CRPC decision-
holders non-pecuniary damages. The Human Rights Chamber's decisions further
protect the rights of CRPC decision-holders... With the consistent pressure of the
International Community, more and more displaced persons and refugees have
been able to return with the assistance of CRPC decisions, which operated as a
check on a domestic system which is not yet fully impartial or independent.
55"
Thus, as demonstrated above, a strong judiciary is crucial to the success of
humanitarian aid efforts. As a result of the international community strengthening
the judiciary by enforcing the Human Rights Chamber decisions and reforming
domestic judicial institutions, protection of the human rights of refugees and I DPs
has increased. In addition, their prospects for integration into a post-war civil
society have greatly improved.
52. See Human Rights Co-ordination Center, supra note 49, at 16.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id. at 46. The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees




The Conflict in Kosovo
Kosovo is a small region within Serbia and Montenegro, the state formerly
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). 56 Located in southern
Serbia, the province of Kosovo is bordered by Montenegro, Albania, and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 7 Totaling around 90 percent of the
inhabitants of Kosovo in 1991, ethnic Albanians comprised the majority of the
population. 58
High tensions between Serbs and Albanians flared in 1998 and resulted in
open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanians,
organized into the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 59 Throughout 1998, over
1,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed and more than 400,000 people were driven
from their homes. 60 The international community soon became concerned over the
situation in Kosovo. Considering the impacts that had resulted to the former
republics of Yugoslavia from earlier wars, NATO threatened the use of air strikes
unless Serbian leaders accepted an agreement that would limit the presence of
Serbian troops in Kosovo. 61 Under this pressure, President Milogevid agreed to
withdraw the bulk of Serbian and Yugoslav army forces from the region, thus
preventing the air strikes.62 However, tensions again flared at the beginning of
1999 and the continuation of the threat of air bombardment resulted in the ill-fated
Rambouillet Agreement of February 1999.63
The negotiations known as the Rambouillet Agreement ended problematically
with the Kosovar Albanian delegation signing the proposed agreement and the
Serbian delegation refusing to sign. 64 Following the rejection of the Rambouillet
Agreement, Serbian military forces began to increase their efforts against the
56. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL ENVOY - EXTERNAL RELATIONS UNIT, BH REFUGEES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, June 1996. Following the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Id. On
February 4, 2003 the Yugoslav parliament approved a constitution creating the state of Serbia and
Montenegro and formally dissolving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Jean-Eudes Barrier, Serbia
and Montenegro on Thin Ice: Djukanovic, Agence France Presse, Feb. 7, 2003.
57. See NATO, supra note 2.
58. The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population, 1991, YUGOSLAV SURVEY 1, 3-24
(1992).
59. See NATO, supra note 2. The KLA was demilitarized and officially disbanded on September
20, 1999, thus it no longer formally exists. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A FRAGILE
PEACE: LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR JUSTICE IN KOSOVO 16 (1999), available at
http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/kosovofull1099.htm (last visited June 20, 2003) [hereinafter A
FRAGILE PEACE].
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ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 65 This acceleration of artillery and manpower caused
thousands more to flee their homes as refugees and IDPs.66 On March 23, 1999,
air strikes initiated by NATO began against the FRY.67
The air campaign lasted a total of seventy-seven days and ended on June 10,
1999 with the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. 6 8 Following this
withdrawal, NATO changed its mission objectives to returning refugees and IDPs
to their homes and restoring a lasting peace in Kosovo.69 This mission was to be
carried out under the auspices of the UN, which had sanctioned Yugoslavia's
acceptance of a peaceful solution by announcing the Security Council's intention
to deploy an international civil and security presence in Kosovo.70 The UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established on principles that it would end the
violence in Kosovo, demilitarize the KLA, deploy an international security force,
establish a political process providing for self government, establish an interim
administration, and facilitate the safe return of all refugees. 71 The Kosovo Security
Force (KFOR) was deployed simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Federal
Republic military presence.72 During the course of the ethnic cleansing, thousands
of ethnic Albanian Kosovars were killed "by Serb forces and tens of thousands
more were subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, rape, and other human rights
crimes., 73 Once peace was finally restored in Kosovo, refugees began to return at
a speed unparalleled following past conflicts. 74 By the time the first official UN
sanctioned return of 300 ethnic Albanians to Kosovo occurred on June 28, 1999,
"nearly half of the 860,000 refugees who fled to Albania and Macedonia had
already ignored warnings of danger and returned home. 75
Following the conflict, humanitarian aid reached Kosovo and efforts to
restore a civil society and increase the general welfare began.76 However, human
rights violations were widespread, causing many refugees and IDPs not to return.
In fact some fled abuse, frustrating humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts.
77
For example, upon the return of refugees to their homes, many Serbs remaining in
Kosovo were driven north due to reprisals or fear of ethnic Albanians. 78 The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that









73. LCHR: Kosovo, supra note 7, at 2.
74. See id.
75. Kosovo Refugees Go Home, THE MIRROR, June 29, 1999, at 2.
76. See NATO, supra note 2.
77. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2.




troops during June 1999.79 In September 1999, the number of Serbs left in Kosovo
was estimated at around 97,000 and it is estimated that by October 1999, 75
percent of Kosovo's Serbs had left the province.80 Those that remained in Kosovo
were subject to the fear and perpetration of ongoing human rights violations.8'
Preceding the cessation of violence in Kosovo, Serbs and other minorities were
reportedly confined to their apartments 24 hours a day, or at least, could not leave
82their enclaves without KFOR escorts. Because the human rights of these Serbs
could not be protected, their access to markets, health care, and other services were
seriously restricted, which forced them almost entirely to depend on direct
assistance delivered by UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations. 3 This
situation demonstrates that the initial weakness of the legal system established by
UNMIK was eroding efforts of humanitarian organizations to provide effective
humanitarian aid. 4 A sense that human rights were not being protected and
remedies for violations were unavailable had undermined the sense of protection
that must accompany humanitarian efforts in order for them to be successful.
8 5
Applicable Human Rights Law in Kosovo
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999) authorized the
Special Representative of the Secretary General to determine the laws that were
applicable within the framework of the newly established legal system.86 This
resulted in Regulation No. 1999/I on the Authority of the Interim Administration
in Kosovo, which stipulates:
The laws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall
continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with the standards
referred to in section 2(16), the fulfillment of the mandate given to UNMIK under
UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the present or any other
regulation issued by UNMIK.
87
UNMIK's interpretation was that those provisions of FRY and Serbian laws
in force on March 23, 1999, "insofar as they were consistent with internationally
79. Id.
80. A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2.
81. See id. "Serbs continue to be the primary target of violent attacks, including killings, beatings
and forced evictions, which are often followed by the looting and torching of houses. In addition,
threats and intimidation against Serbs continue to be reported almost daily by UNHCR and KFOR." Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 60. "The inability to react swiftly to crime and public unrest,
particularly in postconflict situations when criminal activity tends to increase, and the failure to detain
and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can quickly erode the public's confidence in the
United Nations .... Thus, the establishment of effective judicial institutions can be critical to the long-
term success of a mission and the sustainability of its governance and democratic-institution-building
efforts." id. at 60.
85. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 2-3.
86. See id. at 4.
87. See id.
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recognized human rights standards," constituted the law that was to be applied to
human rights violations.8 8 However, this applicable law was contested by Kosovar
judges, prosecutors, and lawyers who refused to apply the Serbian Criminal
Code.8 9 They saw it as discriminatory and argued that the applicable law should
include the Kosovo Criminal Code, which had been in force until it was revoked
by the Serbian Parliament in 1989.90 These members of the legal system saw the
revocation of the Kosovo Criminal Code as unconstitutional in relation to the FRY
Constitution and, therefore, illegitimate. 91  Less resistance was shown to the
application of the FRY Criminal Code because it had applied to all parts of
Yugoslavia before 1991 and had been passed in 1977 with the participation of
Kosovo.92 To resolve this dispute, the UN:
adopted Regulations 1999/24 and 1999/25, which identified applicable law to be
the law in force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989, and repealed the provision of
Regulation 1999/1 applying contemporary FRY/Serbian law. With this decision,
JNMIK identified an acceptable body of law and effectively ended the question
of which law to apply. However, this decision was not made, nor was the issue
resolved, until the transitional administration had been on-ground for six
months.
93
Thus, law that had been in force in Kosovo was applied to the extent that it
met international standards for human rights protections. International standards
became substituted where the law of Kosovo did not meet this level of protection.94
It should be noted that during the conflict in BiH, the International Court of Justice
had determined that Yugoslavia, and thus the province of Kosovo, was bound to
the agreements that were been previously entered into by the former Socialist
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Interestingly, the Kosovo Criminal Code does not contain provisions covering war crimes
or crimes against humanity while the FRY Code details provisions covering these crimes. Id.
91. Id. During the period of Titoist Yugoslavia, which was assembled following World War II
and lasted until the late 1980s, Kosovo existed as an autonomous province within Serbia and
participated within the Yugoslav parliament. See MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE
THIRD BALKAN WAR 31-33 (1996). In the wake of the collapse of communism and the removal of
Soviet influence in Yugoslavia, Serbian leader Slobodan Miloevid stripped Kosovo of its autonomy in
1989 and brought it directly under the control of Belgrade. See NATO, supra note 2. The Kosovar
Albanians were left under the control of the Serbian government, with which ethnic Albanians had little
sympathy. See id.; F.H. Knelman, Kosovo: A Retrospective, 32(2) PEACE RES. 48 (2000). "There is no
question that the general mood of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo welcomed separation and
sympathized with the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army]." Id. at 52.
92. A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 4.
93. Wendy S. Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the
Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 375
(2001).
94. The law established to handle human rights violations in Kosovo was formulated by "[ulsing
the code of criminal procedure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as its basis, but applying those
laws within the framework of recognized international human rights standards." Strohmeyer, supra
note 6, at 49.
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included the UDHR.95
Therefore, the law to be domestically applied to human rights violations in
Kosovo was consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.
However, unlike in BiH, a judicial mechanism similar to the Human Rights
Commission was not established. Instead, human rights violations were addressed
by the newly established UNMIK judicial system applying domestic law that
included human rights protections that met international standards. The next
section will discuss the problems encountered under this system, steps taken to
remedy these problems, and the effects of a stronger judiciary on human rights
protections and their effects on refugee and IDP return.
The Problem with the Judiciary in Kosovo, Remedies to Address these Problems,
and the Effects of a Stronger Judiciary
The newly established judicial system in Kosovo faced the major problem of
the lack of a basic legal framework.96 This included confusion as to applicable
law, 97 the lack of resources, and the lack of a physical infrastructure.98  The
previous administration that had governed Kosovo was completely driven out,
therefore, an operating judicial system had to be constructed from the ground up.99
The personnel required to administer judicial functions had fled the province or
were "tainted by their perceived affiliation with the previous regime;" the
courthouses and facilities had been destroyed, looted, and mined; and the laws that
were in existence were "politically charged and no longer acceptable to the
population and the new political classes."'' °  To remedy these problems, the
international community had to strengthen the newly established judiciary by
95. See DeWeese, supra note 33, at 634.
96. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 58.
97. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 7. At the end of September 1999, the LCHR sent a
delegation to Kosovo to assess the effectiveness of the legal system that the international committee had
established in Kosovo. Id. at 1. The LCHR opinion resulting from this mission stated that, "The fair
and effective functioning of the judiciary, and respect for its role within a democratic society, are
cornerstones for a viable future in Kosovo based on the rule of law. As a consequence, laying the
groundwork for an independent and impartial justice system is an essential task for UNMIK - and one
of its most pressing challenges. The persistent lack of effective judicial institutions is a key factor in
perpetuating a climate of insecurity in Kosovo. The impact is severe: in the absence of any effective
deterrent, the level of crime and violence continues to be high. This applies to ethnically motivated
crime against minorities, including murders, abductions, beatings, looting, arson, forced evictions,
threats and intimidation, and increasingly also to organized criminal activities which impact on the
security situation of all inhabitants of Kosovo. Moreover, enabling the domestic justice system to
administer justice with regard to the crimes committed in Kosovo under the previous regime, most
notably war crimes and crimes against humanity after March 1998, is of utmost importance for the
future of Kosovo. If justice is seen to be done in such cases, tensions between Kosavar Albanians and
others, particularly Serbs, may decrease, improving the conditions for dialogue, and, eventually, for
peaceful co-existence in Kosovo. If justice is not seen to be done, this will inevitably increase the
tension between the Albanian and Serb communities." Id. at 7.
98. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 57.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 48.
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deciding the question of applicable law, creating a new legal framework, and
rebuilding the legal infrastructure. Otherwise, human rights violations would not
be sufficiently addressed and returnees, especially Serbs, would continue to flee
the province following return.
A major problem that UNMIK encountered early in the process of
establishing a legal framework was the question of applicable law.' 0' The
application of disputed law could cause discrepancies in rulings, which could
weaken the confidence of refugees and IDPs in regard to whether they would
receive a respectable trial and judgment. 10 2 If the fear that a high margin of error
existed in regard to legal proceedings, a sense of security would be hard to
maintain. A flood of appeals due to error could also overload a system already
under strain and further weaken confidence in the judiciary. ,
In the power vacuum present following the end of the hostilities in Kosovo,
the judiciary had no clear guidance on what law to apply until the United Nations
resolved the problem by issuing Regulations 1999/24 and 1999/25.03 As
described above, this action by the international community established the
applicable domestic law to be consistently applied to human rights violations in
Kosovo. This strengthened the judiciary and increased the level of human rights
protection for individuals in Kosovo.
Another problem that hampered the development of a legal framework in
Kosovo was the lack of substantial resources dedicated to development of an
effective and just judiciary.104 Once the applicable law was established, it was
deemed of paramount importance that the resulting codes be translated into all
necessary languages and that the laws be reviewed to ensure compliance with the
standards set forth by the international community. 0 5 Furthermore, a system to
print and distribute the body of applicable law was recommended to increase
reliance on the proper law and reduce the possibilities of procedural error.
0 6
Translation of draft legislation formulated following the conflict was
constricted due to the absence of personnel that possessed the necessary language
and specialist knowledge. 0 7 Four months following the withdrawal of the FRY
military presence, UNMIK was not equipped with the financial resources needed
to hire qualified translators.'08 This facilitated a period of time in which applicable
law was still uncertain and allowed the KLA to fill the power vacuum with an
authority that most refugees and IDPs were unlikely to trust.'09  Adequate
101. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 5.
102. See id. at 5. Suspects may have been arrested following one set of legal principles and then
had a differing set of principles applied during subsequent hearings, therefore, the possibility of
procedural error could be quite high. Id.
103. See Betts et al., supra note 94, at 375.
104. See A FRAGILE PEACE, supra note 60, at 3.
105. See id. at 5.
106. See id. at 6.
107. Id.
108. See id at 3.
1 09. See id.; Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 49.
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resources were also needed to ensure that qualified personnel were made available
to the newly established judiciary to reduce the possibility of procedural error and
ensure the fairness of proceedings." 0 Without proper resources, the international
community struggled to strengthen the presence of the newly established judicial
system that would address the human rights issues that plagued returning refugees
and IDPs. The need to allocate resources was made apparent by these problems
and the international community had to respond by providing funds for the
judiciary.
The physical infrastructure of the judicial system also had to be
reconstructed."' According to Strohmeyer:
In Kosovo, virtually all public buildings, including the courts, had to be cleared of
mines and booby traps before they could be reclaimed for public purposes. In the
course of the conflict, files had been dislocated, official forms and stationary had
been destroyed, and valuable office equipment had been appropriated by the
withdrawing security apparatus. The situation was so grave that the first UN-
appointed judges and prosecutors had to bring their own dated typewriters to the
initial hearings to be able to draft decisions and court records." 
2
Thus, the international community had to rebuild the physical infrastructure,
as well as provide the resources for the legal framework, and decide the question
of applicable law. However, once the international community solved these
problems, the judicial system became stronger and more effective in protecting the
human rights of refugees and IDPs." 3 The presence of a stronger judiciary in
Kosovo had positive effects on the humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts
initiated by the international community. This is evidenced by the gradual
reduction in both the number of returnees, especially Serbs, leaving the province,
and in the levels of post-conflict violence." 14 As a result of the strengthening of the
judiciary in Kosovo and the increased protection of human rights, a sense of civil
responsibility and a semblance of normalcy has returned to the province, thus
improving the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts of the
international community.
110. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 55. "The scarcity of experienced legal personnel affected the
legal-assistance sector as well." Id.
11. See id. at 57.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 60.
114. See id. "In Kosovo, a total of 14,878 criminal offenses were reported from January to August
2000 alone; over the same period 3,734 people were arrested. Thus, the establishment of effective
judicial institutions can be critical to the long term success of a mission and the sustainability of its
governance and democratic-institution-building efforts." Id.
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EAST TIMOR
The Conflict in East Timor
On August 30, 1999, East Timor voted to (i) reject a proposal for special
autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia and (ii) seek independence."1
5
"Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with
the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of
violence, looting, and arson throughout the entire territory."'"1 6  Indonesia was
responsible for maintaining peace in the territory, however, the lack of effective
response led to many people being killed and as many as 500,000 being driven
from their homes as refugees and IDPs."17  After the start of the violence,
Indonesian armed forces and police effectively withdrew completely from the
territory." 8  The UN Security Council then adopted Resolution 1272 (1999) to
establish the United Nations Temporary Administration for East Timor
(UNTAET), "an integrated, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation fully
responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to
independence." 119
Refugees soon began to arrive after this resolution. In the first half of 2000,
more than 167,000 refugees returned from other areas of Indonesia, while an
estimated 85,000 to 120,000 remained in camps in West Timor. 120 In the wake of
returns, human rights violations were widespread. 121  "Many East Timorese
returning from West Timor were abused for alleged militia links by local officials
of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT)... and by members
115. UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION FOR EAST TIMOR (UNTAET), EAST TIMOR -





119. Id. "UNTAET was given 'all legislative and executive authority, including the administration
ofjustice."' Bongiorno, supra note 26, at 628.
120. UNTAET, supra note 116.
121. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001: EAST TIMOR:
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/asia/etimor.html (last
visited July 21, 2003). For example, one East Timorese woman reported that she was driven from her
home by militia violence and witnessed the beheading of an East Timorese man by the Indonesian
National Army. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Eyewitness Accounts by Timorese Refugees, (1999)
available at http://www.etan.org/et99c/october/ 7-23/21eyewit.htm (last visited July 21, 2003). The
woman, who was displaced to Australia, has experienced sleeplessness and weight loss as a result of
witnessing the execution. Id. A student, also displaced to Australia after voting in the referendum for
independence, reported observing Indonesian soldiers and police shooting people and burning houses.
Id. As a result of witnessing these atrocities the student claims that, "I still get nightmares and panic
attacks when I see someone wearing a black T-shirt. I still feel frightened and jumpy all the time,
especially when I see someone with a gun. I felt like a hunted animal. I have difficulty pushing my
mind to remember things and then I remember things I want to forget. I cannot rest. I cannot sleep."
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of the former guerilla army, Falintil."'122  Furthermore, Protestant, Muslim, and
ethnic Chinese minorities also suffered human rights abuses for their alleged "ties
to the Indonesian power structure." ' A functioning judiciary was needed to
address these human rights violations. UNTAET was in a position similar to that
of Kosovo, in that a functioning judiciary needed to be established from the ground
Up.124 Again, the judicial infrastructure had to be re-built with limited resources
and the question of applicable human rights law needed to be decided. 125  These
responsibilities were shouldered by the international community.
Applicable Human Rights Law in East Timor
As in Kosovo, UNTAET had assumed initial responsibility for complete
administration of the judicial system; therefore, UNTAET had the authority to
determine the applicable law to be applied domestically to adjudicate human rights
violations. 126 "Because almost all of East Timor's lawyers had been trained in
Indonesian universities, UNTAET decided in November 1999 that Indonesian law
would be the applicable law except where it conflicted with international
standards."' 127  Unlike the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Indonesia was not a signatory nation to the ICCPR or the ICESCR. 12  Therefore,
the International Bill of Human Rights was not applicable in East Timor until
UNTAET established the applicable law following the move for independence.
Thus, applicable domestic law in East Timor regarding human rights
violations met international standards, however, the infrastructure problems kept
the judicial system from operating effectively. When the first East Timorese
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders were ready to begin operation on January
7, 2000, the court building was not ready and there was no place to house
122. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 122. The National Council of East Timorese




125. See Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 50. "The preexisting judicial infrastructure in East Timor
was virtually destroyed. Most court buildings had been torched and looted, and all court equipment
furniture, registers, records, archives, and - indispensable to legal practice - law books, case files, and
other legal resources dislocated or burned. In addition, all judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and many
judicial support staff who were perceived as being members de facto of the administrative and
intellectual privileged classes, or who had been publicly sympathetic to the Indonesian regime, had fled
East Timor after the results of the popular consultation were announced. Fewer than ten lawyers were
estimated to have remained, and these were believed to be so inexperienced as to be unequal to the task
of serving in a new East Timorese justice system. In this situation, it quickly became apparent to
UNTAET officials that a justice system in East Timor, including the necessary regulatory framework,
first had to be built- and built within the shortest possible time - before it could be administered, as
called for in Security Council Resolution 1272." Id.
126. See Bongiorno, supra note 26, at 628.
127. Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.
128. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 5
(2002).
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suspects.1 29 Investigations into violations, including killings, were slow because it
took time to rebuild the judicial system. 30 Initially, investigations into rape cases
were virtually non-existent; "serious investigations into rape as an element of
crimes against humanity only began in July.' 3' Therefore, the newly established
judiciary was not effectively addressing human rights violations. In order to
alleviate some of the burden on this barely functioning system, the establishment
of the National Return and Reconciliation Commission was proposed. 32  This
judicial mechanism would strengthen the overall judiciary by allowing minor
human rights violations to be addressed. 3 3  This judicial mechanism will be
described in the next section, followed by a discussion of its impacts on the East
Timorese judicial system and its effects on humanitarian aid efforts.
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor
The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor
(Commission) was originally formulated in June 2000 by the CNRT Congress.
"[B]y August, a coordinating committee led by UNTAET was considering a plan
that would allow perpetrators of lesser offenses, such as arson or looting to make a
full confession of their misdeeds before the commission."'' 34 "Traditional justice
mechanisms at the local level would then assign the perpetrator to some form of
community service, but the misdeeds, the confession, and the 'sentence' would be
registered with the formal court system."' 135  The text of the regulation that
established the Commission was approved by the National Council of East Timor
in June 2001.136 The first meeting of the National Commissioners took place on
February 4, 2002. 37 This mechanism allowed for lesser human rights abuses to be
addressed at the local level. Thus, the more formal judicial system was not
129. Human Rights Watch, supra note 122. The court building had been destroyed by militias and
was not ready until March. Id. "At one point, UNTAET's own police stopped making any arrests of
suspected criminals, including those involved in the 1999 violence, because it had no place to put them;
the one detention center in the entire country, a former Ministry of Tourism building, had long since
exceeded capacity, and the main prison in the capital, Dili, was only rehabilitated in May." Id
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, Background (2002)
available at http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/bgd.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
133. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.
134. Id.; Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, supra note 133. The
Commission has three main functions: I) Truth Seeking: The Commission will seek the truth regarding
human rights violations in East Timor within the context of the political conflicts. Id. The Commission
will establish a truth-telling mechanism for perpetrators to describe, acknowledge, and record human
rights abuses. Id. 2) Community Reconciliation: The Commission will facilitate a method for dealing
with past cases of lesser crimes such as looting, burning and minor assault. In each case, a panel
comprised of a Regional Commissioner and local community leaders will mediate between victims and
perpetrators to reach agreement on an act of reconciliation to be carried out by the perpetrator. Id. 3)
Recommendations to Government: The Commission will report on human rights and make
recommendations to the government for further action regarding the protection of human rights. Id.
135. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 122.




burdened with these claims and could concentrate its limited resources on more
serious violations. The success of the Commission can be demonstrated by the fact
that (i) the transition period in East Timor has been stabilized and (ii) East Timor
became an independent country on May 20, 2002.3s The utilization of this judicial
mechanism strengthened the overall judicial system of East Timor and provided a
means for returnees to quickly and adequately address human rights abuses. This
allowed humanitarian and nation-building efforts to be successful, as is evidenced
by their efforts culminating in the acceptance by the UN, and the world, of East
Timor as the world's newest nation.
AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
The Conflict in Afghanistan
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on
September II, 2001, the United States began the war on terrorism. A major event
in this war was the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and
supported al-Qaeda terrorists bent on attacking U.S. and Western interests at home
and abroad. Military action against the Taliban regime began on October 7, 2001,
which led to the eventual removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan by year's end and
the establishment of an interim administrative government led by Hamid Karzai.
139
After the establishment of the new government in Afghanistan, security
remained one of the most pressing problems facing Afghan refugees and IDPs
returning to Afghanistan. In February 2002, a United Nations representative stated
that "'security continues to be of the foremost concern."' 140 This security problem
was demonstrated during the return of refugees that followed the establishment of
the interim government. 14 1 Afghan refugees and IDPs were in a situation where
138. See UNTAET, Completed Peacekeeping Operations, East Timor: UNTAET (2002) available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm (last visited July 21, 2003).
139. See The Patient Accumulation of Successes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 9; A Little
More Clearing Up To Do, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 1I. Talks in Bonn, Germany between
four Afghan factions on December 5, 2001 led to the agreement establishing the interim government to
be headed by Mr. Karzai. Afghanistan's Government: Suddenly, in Bonn, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
2001, at 18. These talks also led to the affirmation that a tribal council, the loya jirga, would convene
in June of 2002 in order to further define the shape and future of the Afghan government. See William
Riley, UN Official: Security No. I Afghan Problem, UPI, Feb. 27, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Although the Taliban was removed from power in Kabul within two months from the beginning of the
conflict, fighting against aI-Qaeda persisted in Afghanistan until the spring of 2002. See Satellites and
Horsemen, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9,2002, at 27.
140. Riley, supra note 140. Security was initially provided by the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), which operated primarily in Kabul. See Afghanistan: Guns Before Butter, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2002, at 13. Outside of Kabul, however, security was deficient as Afghanistan
lacked a functional national army or police force. Id.
141. See Riley, supra note 140. "... [A] new wave of refugees from Afghanistan to Pakistan
highlighted a chronic lack of stability in the region. Hundreds continued to arrive everyday, many of
them, according to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, ethnic Pashtuns fleeing
human rights abuses." Id.
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security was not properly provided and the risk of human rights abuses existed.
Thus, to develop a sense of security and successful humanitarian aid efforts, a
strong judiciary bolstered by the international community is necessary.
The Role of the International Community in the Afghan Judiciary
The need for a strong judiciary and the necessity of the involvement of the
international community in Afghanistan to allow for proper post-conflict
humanitarian aid has been recognized. 142 Early in the development of the interim
government in Afghanistan, "[t]he interim authority and the office of Lakhdar
Brahimi, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special representative, had turned their
attention to the establishment of the Judicial Commission and the Human Rights
Commission, which would provide for the foundations of the rule of law."'143 This
focus on strengthening the judiciary was implemented in conjunction with
activities by non-governmental organizations and the interim Afghan government
to facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes. 144 Furthermore, the
UN established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to oversee
post-conflict humanitarian aid activities within the borders of Afghanistan.
45
Thus, to protect the human rights of Afghan refugees and IDPs, the international
community recognized the need for quickly establishing a strong judiciary and
took steps to promote its foundation.
International donor support for Afghan reconstruction has been quite large.
As of October 1, 2001, the U.S. had committed 840 million dollars for
humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts. 14 6 This includes the majority of the
297 million dollars pledge by the United States at the Tokyo Donors' Conference
in January 2002, where the international community as a whole pledged 5 billion
dollars for Afghanistan. 147 Of the monies donated by the United States, 5 million
dollars has been given to promote the work of three commissions established by
the Afghan government "to draft a new constitution, promote judicial reform, and
encourage respect for human rights."'149 Considering that the international
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, The U.S. Can't Allow Justice to Be Another War Casualty, LOS
ANGELES TiMES, Dec. 17, 2001, pt. 2, p. II. "The precise shape of the emerging Afghan judicial
system, created under the transitional administration now headed by interim Prime Minister Hamid
Karzai, remains to be determined. Whatever happens, United Nations transitional support and
involvement will be necessary to stabilize the post-conflict environment, to address pressing
humanitarian needs of returning refugees, to promote the Bonn process of building a representative
post-Taliban government and to address justice, accountability and truth telling about past human rights
abuses by all parties to the Afghan conflict." Id.
143. Riley, supra note 140.
144. Id.
145. See STATE DEPARTMENT, State Department Documents U.S. Support for Afghan Women and
Children; Report to Congress on Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001, Federal Information
and News Dispatch, Inc., June 12, 2002.
146. See STATE DEPARTMENT, Fact Sheet: Rebuilding Afghanistan; U.S. Support for Afghan
Reconstruction Totals $840 Million, Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., January 10, 2003.
147. Id.
148. Id. The U.S. has also contributed to the reformation of the judiciary "by providing
infrastructure for legal professionals and support for effective functioning of the courts." Id. The
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community has recognized the importance of an effective judiciary to allow for
successful humanitarian aid, this support should translate into a solution to the
security problem initially faced by refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan and allow for
the humanitarian aid efforts of the international community to be effective.
The Conflict in Iraq
Upon the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations passed UN
Security Council Resolution 687, which provided for a cease-fire of hostilities and
the formation of a UN inspection program to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). 149 This UN action lead to the creation of the UN Special
Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq (UNSCOM), which worked in tandem
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to dismantle Iraq's nuclear
and other WMD programs. 150 However, the Iraqi regime continually frustrated the
efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, eventually leading to the cessation of
inspections in 1998.'1' The expulsion of the UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 spelled
an end to UN inspection of Iraqi WMD programs at that time. However, UN
Resolution 1284 later established the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission
(UNMOVIC).' 52 This inspection commission was seen as a weaker version of
UNSCOM and did not lead to an inspection program that ultimately disarmed
Iraq. 1
53
In November of 2003, the UN reaffirmed its 12-year-old instruction to Iraq to
disarm with the unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441. 4 This
resolution allowed weapons inspectors to return to Baghdad on November 27,
2002.'5' Resolution 1441 threatened serious consequences if Iraq failed to disarm.
The United States felt that this resolution provided the authority it needed to justify
military action to implement the disarmament of Iraq.' 56  The United States
indicated that it would consider the disarmament of Iraq using military force with a
Italian government, however, is taking the lead role in rebuilding the judiciary. Id.
149. See KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INVADING IRAQ 52
(2002).
150. Id. at 61-62. During these initial inspections, discoveries prompted Iraq to admit that it had
been attempting to develop nuclear weapons, as well as tum over large quantities of weapons developed
under other WMD programs. Id. at 62.
151. See Burden of Proof THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 13. The Iraqi National Assembly
voted to end cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors on August 4, 1998. POLLACK, supra note
150, at 90. By October of that year, Baghdad announced it would no longer co-operate with the
inspectors. Id. at 91.
152. POLLACK, supra note 150, at 100.
153. Id. at 234-235. The purpose of the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission
(UNMOVIC) was to determine the tasks remaining for the disarmament of Iraq and to determine the
progress made toward reaching those goals. Id. at 100.
154. Burden of Proof, supra note 152, at 13.
155. See Special Report: Dealing With Iraq, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8,2003, at 24.
156. Burden of Proof, supra note 152, at 13. As for inspectors, under Resolution 1441 Iraq
"promised the weapons inspectors immediate, unimpeded and private access." Special Report: Dealing
with Iraq, supra note 156, at 24.
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coalition of allies.' 57 Conversely, the United States also expressed support for
further UN resolutions that would have sanctioned military action against Iraq.1
58
However, lacking UN resolutions sanctioning immediate military action, the
United States, leading a "coalition of the willing" to remove the regime of Saddam
Hussein, attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003.159
Prior to the use of military force against Iraq, fears existed that a climate
where the human rights of refugees and IDPs could be abused would be created.
60
For example, following the Gulf War, the destabilization of the Iraqi regime
prompted an uprising of Kurds in northern Iraq that led to the displacement of a
massive number of refugees and horrific human rights violations.16' Furthermore,
Iraqi society is traditionally tribal in nature. 6 2 Following the armed conflict, tribal
rivalries and divisions could cause the widespread abuse of human rights. Thus,
the conflict in Iraq could potentially give rise to the same types of problems
experienced in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor-namely, returning refugees and
IDPs being subjected to human rights abuses with no judiciary in place strong
enough to protect their rights.
The Role of the International Community in the Iraqi Judiciary
The legal system that existed in Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein was
characterized by one UN report as "incompatible with human rights because
President Saddam Hussein controlled the judiciary, the armed forces, police, and
politics."'' 63 The pre-conflict legal system in Iraq was comprised of two separate
systems: one of civil law, and one of Islamic law that operated "through separate
courts with different jurisdictions."' 164 As is evidenced by the poor human rights
record of the Iraqi regime, this system was unable to address human rights
violations. 65 In fact, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iraq stated
in 1997 "that there was no rule of law in Iraq."' 66 Given the status of the pre-
157. id.
158. See id. at 25.
159. See In the Fog of War, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at II.
160. See The Coming Dash for Safety, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Economist.com, Mar. 4,
2003, available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StorylD=1620357 (last
visited July 21, 2003). "America is talking of up to 2 million people uprooted internally by the war.
The United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR, is planning for 600,000 to 1.5 million refugees, plus 2
million more displaced within Iraq." Id.
161. See POLLACK, supra note 150, at 51. The Iraqi regime killed as many as 20,000 Kurds in
Kurdistan and drove more than 500,000 from their homes. Id. Conflict also erupted in other areas of
the country leading to the deaths of an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 Shi'ah Muslims. Id.
162. See id. at 112-114.
163. UN Says Human Rights Abuses Worsening in Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 3, 1999.
164. Iraq: Country Profile, Middle E. Rev. World of Info., Oct. 2, 2002.
165. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1992, U.S. Department of
State Dispatch, March 1993. "The Iraqi regime's abysmal record on human rights continued without
improvement in 1992. Systematic violations of human rights in virtually all categories continued.
There were mass executions of political opponents, widespread use of torture, extreme repression of
ethnic groups, disappearances, denial of due process, and arbitrary detention." Id.
166. UN Commission Adopts Measures on Humanitarian Standards, Slavery, Women and Girls,
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conflict legal system and its inability to handle human rights abuses, the judicial
system, following the removal of Saddam Hussein, must be equipped to adequately
address human rights violations occurring in Iraq. 67  As in the post-conflict
situations described above, the presence of the international community is vital to
ensuring that a strong judiciary is maintained to protect the human rights of
refugees and IDPs. As demonstrated, the international community must be willing
to devote the initial resources and expertise developed from strengthening the
judiciaries in other post-conflict situations to the judicial system in Iraq in order for
humanitarian aid efforts to be successful.
Prior to the conflict in Iraq, the United States had not firmly stated its
commitment to "nation-building" in Iraq following a military action.168 At that
time, Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary, responded to a question
regarding the use of US troops for nation-building and whether the president has
changed his position on nation-building by stating that, ".. .[T]he president
continues to believe that the purpose of the military should be to fight and to win
wars."' 169 However, Fleischer went on to state:
Our government, broadly speaking, has a variety, however, of agencies that
are well-situated, whose mission is to help protect the peace after a war is fought.
And by that I mean in the event that there is a war with Iraq, the president has
made it very plain in numerous conversations to foreign leaders that immediately
upon military action, if it comes to military action, plans are in place to provide
humanitarian aid and relief for the people of Iraq.
170
Thus, it appeared that the US was willing to provide assistance to Iraq
following any armed conflict precipitated by US action. 17
Following the conflict, the US led coalition has demonstrated a commitment
Justice Issues, M2 Presswire, Apr. 15, 1997. As applicable human rights law, Iraq has signed and
ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR. See United Nations, supra note 129, at 5. However, Iraq has not
adopted the Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. Id.
167. While meeting to discuss the possibilities for governing a post-Saddam Iraq, Iraqi opposition
leaders have already identified the need to reform the Iraqi legal system. See Plans Made to Bring Iraqi
Leader to Justice, THE IRISH NEWS LTD., Dec. 16, 2002, at 8.
168. See Ari Fleischer Holds White House Briefing, FDCH Political Transcripts, Feb. 6, 2003.
169. Id.
170. Id. However, Roy Gutman, senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, director of
American University's Crimes of War Project, and Newsweek magazine's chief diplomatic
correspondent has stated, "the Pentagon is already 'blue-skying' the coming conflict, even suggesting
that troops could be out of Iraq in 60 to 90 days. This administration is 'viscerally opposed to nation-
building..."' Ann McFeatters, Iraqi Civilian Toll, Postwar Trauma Apt to be More Dire than in 1991,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTrE, Feb. 12, 2003, at A12. Gutman further adds that although the
administration opposes nation-building "it is exactly the direction the president is going with his Iraq
policy." Id.
171. The United States has been working with a civilian UN administrator on plans to flood the
country with food and medicine and to rebuild the infrastructure following the conflict. Iraq's
Humanitarian Needs: If Things Go Badly . ., THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2003, at 26. Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs) have been gathering in Jordan and have been "told that an American
Humanitarian Operations Center may be established in Jordan or Kuwait, and that 'safe havens' would
be established for NGOs in Iraq." Id.
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to providing the humanitarian aid necessary to rebuild Iraq. An interim
administrative government, headed by American Paul Bremer, has been
established and reconstruction efforts are underway. 172  However, during the
period immediately following the conflict, Iraq was plagued with widespread
looting. Violence and instability continue to threaten humanitarian aid efforts,
reconstruction, and the formation of government. 173  Thus, the international
community needs to increase the level of its cooperation and assistance in order to
allow for humanitarian aid and reconstruction efforts to be successful in Iraq.
174
This assistance must, at the forefront, include the establishment a strong
judiciary or immediate help in reforming the existing judiciary to meet
international standards of human rights protection and address human rights
violations suffered by refugees and IDPs.175  Regardless of whether a specific
mechanism to protect human rights is employed, as described in regards to BiH
and East Timor, if the international community does not lend its efforts to facilitate
a functioning judiciary capable of protecting human rights, humanitarian aid and
nation-building efforts will ultimately be unsuccessful. According to Tarek Ben
Halim, "Successful nation-building in Iraq is vital for real stability in the
region."176
CONCLUSIONS
Recently, military actions by the international community have been justified
as necessary for humanitarian reasons. If the international community continues to
allow interference with the sovereignty of states, it must be ready to ensure that the
results promised will indeed come to fruition. In order for humanitarian aid and
"nation-building" efforts by the international community to succeed, a strong
judicial system must be in place in post-conflict areas that ensures human rights
are protected. The need for a strong judicial system is evidenced particularly by
the situation in BiH and Kosovo. The methods employed to address human rights
violations in these areas were ineffective prior to the strengthening of the judicial
system by the international community. When the judicial systems and
172. See Post-war Reconstruction: False Start, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 24. The interim
government was initially headed by General Jay Garner, however, General Garner was replaced in May
2003 by Paul Bremer, the former head of counter-terrorism in the State Department, as the head of the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. Id.
173. Id. Six weeks after the occupation of Baghdad, looting still continued with the majority of
looters unpunished. See Freedom, But Without Law and Order, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 50.
174. A UN Security Counsel resolution is expected to be passed in early June 2003 that would
increase UN responsibilities in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. See Iraq and the UN: Making It
Legit, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2003, at 52.
175. Prior to the conflict, the US State Department had already initiated the Future of Iraq Project,
which has brought about 30 exiled Iraqi judges and lawyers together to read a report of
recommendations for reforming Iraq's legal system. See Caryle Murphy, Area's Exiles Plot a Model
Iraq; Talk of War Propels Groups as They Plan a Shift to Democracy, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2003,
at B I.
176. Tarek Ben Halim, Waging a "Good War"for Arabs; If Democracy Takes Root in Iraq, It Can
Sweep Across the Middle East, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 9,2003, at M5.
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mechanisms for protecting human rights were weak, refugees and IDPs returning
to their homes experienced on-going human rights violations that undermined the
effectiveness of humanitarian aid efforts. After the international community
solved the major problems with the judiciary in both BiH and Kosovo, increased
protection of human rights was provided, and humanitarian aid efforts became
more successful in allowing returnees to live in a peaceful, sustainable society.
Applicable human rights laws must be quickly determined and resources must be
made available to carryout important judicial tasks. When mechanisms such as the
Human Rights Chamber are employed, the judiciary must be made strong enough
in its own right to enforce the decisions of these bodies. The international
community must provide the needed aid to strengthen the judiciary in a post-
conflict situation.
The use of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in East Timor allowed
human rights violations to be handled in an efficient manner at the local level.
This aided the re-establishment of the rule of law and hastened a return to normal
society in a post-conflict situation. East Timor is a definitive example of how a
strong judiciary addressing human rights violations can lead to the successful and
speedy establishment of a civil society in post conflict situations. Once again, the
role of the international community was vital in assuring the presence of a strong
judiciary.
Humanitarian aid efforts can only be said to be truly successful if refugees
and IDPs can return to lives that are somewhat comparable to lives they were
forced to leave because of armed conflict. If human rights violations are not
quickly addressed and adequate protection against on-going violations is not
provided, then return to a civil life is more difficult. Protection of human rights is
an essential constituent of a civilized society and there is no question that they are
essential to all citizens of that society, be they refugees or IDPs. As is
demonstrated by the post-conflict situations in BiH, Kosovo, and East Timor, a
strong judicial system that protects human rights is a key factor in ensuring that
humanitarian aid and "nation-building" efforts are successful. The need for the
presence of the international community to facilitate a functioning judiciary,
regardless of any specific judicial mechanism employed, is unquestionable.
In Afghanistan, the need for a strong judiciary was quickly identified and
funds were made readily available by the international community. Past conflicts
and the conflict in Afghanistan have taught the international community not to
ignore this need when providing humanitarian aid to refugees and IDPs and
rebuilding war-torn societies. For example, following the conflict in Afghanistan,
the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN stated:
Now more than in the past, we recognize the need to address in a coherent
fashion the multiple problems facing societies emerging from conflict: security,
political reconciliation, human rights, restoration of judicial institutions and the
rule of law, disarmament and reintegration of armed combatants but also
reconstruction, return of refugees, employment creation, restoration of civil
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services and many more.
177
In the case of Iraq, the pre-existing judicial system was unable to deal with
human rights violations. Whether the system is completely replaced or completely
reformed following the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, the judicial system
is under an even greater strain and will require strengthening by the international
community. The international community must be intimately involved and not
abandon Iraqi refugees and IDPs to a situation where no judiciary is in place that
can adequately protect them from human rights violations following the conflict.
To do so would cause the humanitarian aid and nation-building efforts of the
international community in Iraq to be unsuccessful.
177. UN Deputy Secretary-General Outlines 'Dominant Concepts' in Development Policy at
Interaction CEO Retreat, M2 Presswire, Dec. 11, 2002.
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